This paper addresses the political constraints on science through a pragmatist critique of Philip Kitcher's account of "well-ordered science." A central part of Kitcher's account is his analysis of the significance of items of scientific research: contextual and purposerelative scientific significance replaces mere truth as the aim of inquiry. I raise problems for Kitcher's account and argue for an alternative, drawing on Peirce's and Dewey's theories of problemsolving inquiry. I conclude by suggesting some consequences for understanding the proper conduct of science in a democracy.
Introduction
My topic for this essay will be the social and political constraints on the operation of science. Modern science is a large-scale social and institutional endeavor, and in order to understand it, we need to understand its role within society and amongst our political institutions. What will be the research agenda for science? How should we distribute funding amongst potential and ongoing scientific projects? How should science be arranged in order to be just? What are the social and political responsibilities of scientists qua scientists?
To many scientists and philosophers of science, these questions will seem inappropriate. It has been a widespread belief that science is an essentially value-free activity, especially in philosophy of science after World War II.
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When it functions well, it provides for us a store of objective truths. When moral, political, and social values enter in, they are essentially corruptingLysenkoism is a stock example. Technology, on this common view, is just the application of science and instrumental rationality towards some goals -while values enter in, it is only as goals set from the outside. This view is generally shared both by the boosters and debunkers of science, differing over whether actual science manages to live up to this ideal or whether science has become "corrupt."
It is becoming harder and harder to deny that values -not just so-called "cognitive" or "epistemic," but moral, social, political values -play an essential role in science, and that science is essentially a social activity. At the same time, many now argue that this need not threaten the integrity of science. A growing number of philosophers are attempting to craft a new image of science, in which the role of values of science are not corrupting, in which they might even play a positive role. In such efforts it is common to explore the social nature of science, determine the proper relation of science to democracy, and problematize the simple dichotomy between science and technology. John Dewey also rejected the view of science as value-free that later became the orthodox view; unlike many present-day philosophers of science, he was not trained under the subsequent orthodoxy. His work provides a useful starting point for trying to understand values in science and science in democracy, in part because Dewey does not face the threat of falling into old, bad assumptions about science (he was never taught to make them). By taking the lead from Dewey, I hope to start from a position free from the mistaken assumptions and false starts of the tradition in philosophy of science.
In this essay, I will analyze recent work by Philip Kitcher in which he works towards an image of science as value-laden. Kitcher has in recent years begun to draw on a variety of pragmatist ideas and espouse some distinctively pragmatist views. I will analyze Kitcher's presentation in his Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001) , which sets out a two-part theory of the relation of science to democracy and the social, political, and moral constraints on science: First, he provides an argument for viewing science as context-dependent but nonetheless objective, in which the concept of scientific significance plays a major role. Scientific significance is supposed to capture the knowledge that a scientific community or discipline has about what areas of research are important, of interest, or worthy of attention. Second, this context-dependent representation of scientific significance is used as an input to an ideal democratic deliberation procedure, in which ideal representatives of the preferences of citizens deliberate and attempt to reach consensus in order to determine the ideal research agenda for science (in our liberal democracy). He calls this ideal "wellordered science." The philosophical-epistemic story about what is significant about science is thus a first step in a socio-political ideal of science. This ideal will be useful, e.g., in funding decisions and decisions of individual scientists in what research to pursue, because we can compare the actual situation and future options to the ideal.
